In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that (...) it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)

The current rise in malpractice litigation has led to concern in the research community as to the prospect of litigation against researchers. Clearly as the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of the research falls upon the researchers they will be potentially liable should there be negligence in the conduct of the research project itself. But to what extent can the research ethics committee and its members be held liable should harm result to the research subject? How far does the prospect (...) of the threat of litigation equate with the reality of the prospect of liability? Although the NHS research governance framework suggests that primary responsibility for the conduct of the trial is with the researcher this does not mean that REC members will be immune from actions in tort where research subjects suffer harm in the conduct of a research project approved by their NHS REC. This paper focuses upon the prospect for liability in the law of tort of NHS RECs and their members. While in practice the vast majority of such claims are unlikely to be successful members of RECs may incur resultant legal costs as a consequence of involvement in proposed litigation. It is submitted that the scope of indemnity provision provided to RECs and their members should be precisely determined, otherwise there is a real prospect that the risk of malpractice litigation may deter individuals from serving on such committees. (shrink)

The double slit experiment for a massive scalar particle is described using intuitionistic logic with quantum real numbers as the numerical values of the particle's position and momentum. The model assigns physical reality to single quantum particles. Its truth values are given open subsets of state space interpreted as the ontological conditions of a particle. Each condition determines quantum real number values for all the particle's attributes. Questions, unanswerable in the standard theories, concerning the behaviour of single particles in the (...) experiment are answered. (shrink)

This paper investigates the behavior of conformal fluctuations of space-time geometry that are admissible under the quantized version of Einstein's general relativity. The approach to quantum gravity is via path integrals. It is shown that considerable simplification results when only the conformal degrees of freedom are considered under this scheme, so much so that it is possible to write down a formal kernel in the most general case where the space-time contains arbitrary distributions of particles with no other interaction except (...) gravity. The behavior of this kernel near the classical space-time singularity then shows that quantum fluctuations inevitably diverge near the singularity. It is shown further that the root cause of this divergence lies in the fact that the Green's function for the conformally invariant scalar wave equation diverges at the singularity. The limitations on the validity of classical general relativity near the space-time singularity are discussed and it is argued that the notion of singularity itself needs to be radically modified once the quantum effects are taken into account. (shrink)

In the paper, the multilevel concept of methodology of science is reviewed. The author distinguishes five levels in the methodology of science. These levels vary in degree of generality and the nature of the relationship with philosophy. The first, most general level of the methodology of ways of learning of the studies on the application of science to philosophical methods such as dialectical and metaphysical. The doctrine of general scientific ways of knowing is the second, less common level of methodology (...) of science. The essence of scientific methods is studied at this level, given their theoretical rationale. There are heuristic dignity, epistemological possibilities, and the boundaries of applicability are identified. The third level of the methodology of science is the study of the system of general scientific ways of learning applied in any basic science. In addition to knowledge of the essence of these methods for the researcher requires knowledge of the basic problems of this science. The fourth level of the methodology of science is the study of the system of general scientific ways of learning and epistemological problems in any basic science. The fifth level of the methodology of science are the problems of narrower plan. This study questions the use of certain, specific methods of scientific learning. Thus, the methodology of science is complex and has a complicated structure. The two most general level the methodology are philosophical, the next two are common to philosophy and science, the fifth level is of a specifically scientific nature. (shrink)